The study monitored the following conclusions: -
1 - Arab countries differed in their positions on the Iraq-Iran war, has supported Libya, Syria, Iran in its war against Iraq and supported military and the oil embargo imposed on Iraq, while Jordan and stood a stand in favor of Iraq. However, the position of those countries did not make the balance of power tipped in favor of Iraq war days, but generally associated with political and economic interests.
2 - Syria and Libya, that promise can be important partners for Iran in its war against Iraq, and that promise can be of key elements in the equation of the war between Iraq and Iran in the absence of any political campaign supports an important position to end the war. From a political point of view you do not want any of them in the state pay for the adoption of an anti-Iran stance against Iraq, and especially that Iran is a country to accept compromise.
3 - Jordan's position in support of Iraq more than the strength of Egypt's position because it wanted its goals through its support of Iraq and to maintain navigation in the Red Sea and ways to secure the arrival of foreign goods to Iraq. Also made the Government of Jordan, its diplomatic efforts to put pressure on the two warring factions and other countries with a view to reaching a comprehensive settlement of the problems between the disputants versa of some countries in Persian Gulf who felt that military force and the use of the positions of the defense of sovereignty and regional security, the need for the success of any diplomatic initiatives to end the war.
4 - that the position of Iraq's opposition to the Egyptian initiative for peace with Israel, represented by the signing of the Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978 under the auspices of U.S. and recognized by Egypt to exist legitimate for Israel as a neighbor to the Arabs after its position toward Iraq in its war with Iran, which was not a principled stand in the political and economic, in the process of supporting the Iraqi war effort required level. However, the possible reaction on the part of Sadat, Egypt has been forced to reconsider its policy in the Arab after he and his Egypt some politicians skeptical of the idea of dealing violently with the possible Arab reaction against his policy toward Israel. It also apparently convinced themselves that the conditions of moving towards the Egyptian policy change would be more appropriate later in the hope of restoring Egypt's relations with the Arab position to the right. And this explains the convergence process during the Egyptian-Iraqi war and looking to resolve political differences.
5 - War of increased Arab hostility to Iran, and that reinforced the perception is not in the Arab hostility, but hostility in the Soviet Union over the issue of risk because the arms of Iran and the Soviet Union, the victory of Iran counting factor imbalance in the balance of power in the region which led him to support Iraq militarily.
6 - led the fight to put pressure on Iran's relations with the PLO, which supported Iraq in its war with Iran, to Iran, leaving little credibility in its quest to lead the Muslims against Israel
7 - Arabs knew very well that Iran wants to achieve a political role equivalent to their new economic and political are trying to get it from its neighbors. They also want to change the elements of political practice, including regional and D is in favor friendships with some of the Arab and Islamic countries from the site of the revolution without attention to the principle of balance of power. Also realized some Arab countries that Iran felt it had become in a position to change the political structure of the area and took a central place and to be an influential player Arabs accept political ambitions.
8 - that the position of Iran's anti-Israel was intended to mitigate the dangers that threaten the Arab Iran, Iraq or make more expensive on the Arab governments, as well as to convince all the Arab and Islamic states that an attack on Iran, Iraq in 1980 was a mistake Iraqis. Also, a public relations between Iran and Israel will spend on a target closer to the Arab countries neighboring Israel.
9 - that the strategy of Iran and political Islam and opposition to Israel serve the strategic goals through the work of Iran to widen the gap between the Arab peoples and the governments corrupt and unpopular across the solicitation of pride in the religious with the Arabs and their frustration of the inability of Arab governments toward Israel and the major powers have failed such a strategy but increased isolation Iran and increased the fears of Arab governments, Iran's ambitions and increased support from the Arab states of Iraq in the war. As Iraq has become more of a threat to Iran from Israel and against Iran that did not translate into violent rhetoric against Israel into concrete actions.
10 - with the survival of Iran's perception that Iraq is a threat to Iran's president may think that most of the politicians to reach a settlement with the Arabs, a vital factor in its security. It also believed that this is achieved in two ways, first find a balance with the Arabs through the alliance with Israel or through taking Iran leading role in the face of Israel, and this shows us that the new Iranian wants to balance the interests of the strategic and ideological condition that reinforce one another while ensuring security, remote long to the fact that non-Arab Iran is a country in the Middle East and Iran's ambitions as long as nothing to do with the Islamic nature of the regime for the most part. They also can claim a natural role as a competitor to excel not only on the Arab countries, but on the Middle East through its participation in all decisions concerning the region. |